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IndianaJones, famous scholar and archaeologist, is walk
ing along a booby-trapped corridor in an ancient temple.
When he happens to step on a triangular blue flagstone, a
poisoned dart fires from the ceiling, barely missing him. He
continues another few paces, and steps on a second triangu
lar blue flagstone; another dart fires, missing his head by only
inches. This pattern happens five or six times, until Indiana
Jones forms the causal belief, "if I step on a triangular blue
flagstone, a dart will fire atme." He avoids the next flagstone,
grabs the golden idot and return safely to America. Later
that week, he happens to be walking down the corridar of the
small college where he teaches. As he turns the corner, he
realizes he is about to plant his foot on a small, triangular blue
flagstone. Immediately, the thought occurs to him, "Dh oh,
darts!" After a second thought, he steps down on the flag
stone, survives, and h,eads off to his class.
Hume's notorious account of causal inferences, in which
"all reasonings are nothing but the effect of custom," claims
that we have no reason for making the causal inferences that
we do. In this theory, Indiana Jones forms the inference "if I
step on a triangular blue flagstone, a dart will fire at me"
solely by force of custom: after observing the constant con
junction of flagstone-stepping and dart-firing, custom leads
his imagination to associate the impression of the former
with the idea of the latter. Once he has developed a sufficient
custom, Indiana Jones' imagination automatically jumps to
the idea of dart-firing whenever it has the impression of
flagstone-stepping.
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This example raises a serious problem for Hume' s theory
of causal inferences. We do not simply endorse every causal
inference that occurs to us. When walking down the college
corridor, Indiana Jones is reasoning on something other than
the custom he has acquired in the Temple of Doom - he
chooses not to endorse the inference" if I step on this flag
stone, a dart will fire atme./1 Can Hume still claim that all our
reasonings are nothing more than the effect of custom? If all
causal inferences are unreasonable, why does Indiana Jones
not endorse the belief he formed in the Temple of Doom?
In Section XIII of Part III of the Treatise, Hume argues for
a naturalistic theory that allows us to make normative judg
ments about causal inferences. This theory relies on an
account of general rules, causal beliefs that generalize over
many different experiences of inference-making. While Hume
intends for general rules to distinguish between 11 good" and
"bad" causal inferences, his argument often seems confusing
and contradictory: general rules figure as both rash" and
"unphilosophical probabilities", as well as guides by which
to distinguish our causal judgments from the activity of the
imagination. If we approach general rules from an external!
objective stance, in which we judge the goodness of causal
inferences by some standard external to the agent, we face
great difficulty in resolving this contradiction. It is only if we
adopt an internal! subjective stance, in which we judge the
goodness of ca usal inferences by the beliefs an agent already
has, that we can understand Hume's intended role for gen
eral rules. In this interpretation, general rules can both.
subvert and reinforce the customs which form our beliefs 
through an equilibrium process in which we seek consis tency
among our beliefs/ customs, we can distinguish between
those inferences which we ought to hold and those we ought
not.
The potential problem with his naturalistic account of
causality is not lost on Hume. In Section XIII, he describes the
possible implications of his naturalistic account of belief, and
the role that custom plays in forming belief:
/I
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It may, therefore, be concluded, that our judgment

and imagination can never be contrary, and that
custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such
a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This
difficulty we can remove after no other manner, than
by supposing the influence of general rules. (Hume
149)
Though Hume never explicitly provides a definitional dis
tinction between judgment and the imagination, we might
ascribe the following view to him: the imagination is the
faculty that forms beliefs, and the judgment is the faculty that
gives its approval to them. But even if we are to make the
distinction along these normative lines, we have to acknowl
edge that we cannot judge causality by a different standard
than imagination, since they are both "judgments" and the
conclusions of the "imagination" are formed by custom.
Hume's answer to this ostensible paradox lies in the roles that
general rules" play in causal inferences.
Although Hume is vague about the content of general
rules, he indicates several ways in which they are used.
Hume cites prejudice as a prime -example of an
"unphilosophical species of probability ... derived from gen
eral rules, which we rashly form to ourselves" (Hume 146).
Several pages later, he characterizes them as rules form'd on
the nature of our understanding, and on our e'xperience of its
operations in the judgments we form concerning objects Tl
(Hume 149). Hume also provides a functional definition of
general rules: in two passages, the first following the previ
ous quotation and the second in Section XV, he claims that
they allow us to distinguish between causes and accidental
circumstances.
When Burne says that general rules are "form'd on the
nature of our understanding, and our experience of its opera
tions/' he implies that general rules are a way of categorizing
our experience of inference-making. This idea of generality
first appears in Section VIII, where Hume accounts for how
we form ca usal beliefs upon only a single instance of conjunc
tion. Although he does not refer to general rules in this
/I
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context, there is a strong similarity between his explanation
in Section VIII and his later development of general rules.
Hume acknowledges that we often seem to arrive at causal
beliefs without the aid of custom, by only observing a single
instance of conjunction of two events. Take the example of a
baker who has never made a souffle before, and accidentally
leaves it in the oven overnight. In the morning, he returns to
find it inedibly burned. Right away, the baker believes his
souffle will be ruined if he leaves it overnight again. This
poses a challenge for Hume's account of how we form causal
beliefs: it is hard to say that custom is responsible for the
baker s belief, since this is the first time he has been faced with
this particular incident.
Bume replies to this objection by expanding our defini
tion of custom. While we have had only one experience of
souffle-burning and overcooking, "we have many millions
[of experiences] to convince us of this principle; that like
objects, plac'd in like circumstances, will always produce like
effects" (Hume 105). Hume does not mean to claim that we
have a rational justification for believing that the future will
resemble the past. Rather, in keeping with his theory, he
argues we come to form a broad habit of expecting the future
to resemble the past. We could picture the imagination, in
Hume's theory, as a short-order cook in a diner (the custom
ers representing impressions, and the entrees ideas). If Bob
asks for a ham-and-swiss sandwich twenty times in a row,
the cook will immediately go andmake the sandwich the next
time she sees him, without waiting for him to ask. After
meeting enough students like Bob who routinely ask for the
same dish, the cook develops a peculiar manner of dealing
with her customers: if Jill only asks once for a hamburger, the
next time the cook spots Jill she will immediately run off to
make a hamburger. Thus, she has developed through custom
the principle that"customers will always want the same dish
they've requested in the past," which is analogous to the
imagination's principle of "like objects, plac' d in like circum
stances, will produce like effects."
l
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Through this example, we can better understand what it
might mean to have a general custom. In his account of how
we form general rules, Hume relies on"the nature of custom
not only to operate with its full force, when objects are
presented, that are exactly with those to which we have been
accustomed; but also to operate in an inferior degree, when
we discover such as are similar" (Hume 147). This suggests
that general rules are a kind of broad custom, akin to the one
formed by the short-order cook, in which we habitually
believe that certain patterns of experience will repeat them
selves. Prejudice, therefore, is a general rule - custom leads
us to generalize our experience under one broad banner,
regardless of what particular experiences might indicate. For
example, let us say we have observed that Bob, Fred, and Joe
(who all happen to be Cretan) are compulsive liars. Instead
ofjustformingthe particular rule that Bob, Fred, and Joe will
continue to be liars, our imagination is often makes general
rule that all Cretans are liars.
So far, general rules have allowed Hume to explain how
we could make the inference, "If I leave a souffle in the oven,
it will get ruined," even if we have only baked cakes 
looking back on our experience, we form the general rule that
all dough products behave similarly. Still, we have not yet
gotten general rules to explain why we consider some infer
ences good and others bad. To make rna tters more confusing,
Hume's normative stance towards general rules often seems
contradictory. He deems prejudice a "rash" form of
"unphilosophical speculation," yet argues that general rules
aid us in separating causes from accidental circumstances. If
all causal inferences are unreasonable, one wants to ask, why
does Hurne consider prejudice unphilosophical? How are
we supposed to Simultaneously employ and steer clear of
general rules?
First, let us consider why Hume might think general rules
are unphilosophical. Intuitively, we think that the general
rrue "all Cretans are liars" is rash when we have met only
three liars who happen to be Cretan. On this view, the
unphilosophicality of a general rule is a function of how
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much experience we have had. We tend to approach general
rules from an external standpoint - we think that the infer
ence, II all Cretans are liars/' fails to meet an objective stan
dard of what constitutes causality. Given more experience,
we believe, we should eventually feel secure in our inference.
Burne takes a completely different view: our causal infer
ences, no matter how much experience we have had, are
never reasonable. Even if we had met the entire population
of Crete except for one person, and discovered them all to be
liars, we would still have no reason to expect the last person
to be a liar. Therefore, it would be difficult to ascribe an
external standard of causality to Hume - we cannot endorse
our general rules on the basis of their past empirical evidence.
Before we consider what Burne's normative stance might
be, it is important to examine how we use general rules to
modify our beliefs. After accounting for the natural mechan
ics of how we form general rules, Bume tries to explain how
we use general rules to regulate our judgment./1 Returning
to the Indiana Jones example, we can see the particular rule
of cause and effect that he formed by habit in the Temple of
Doom: "If I step on a triangular blue flagstone, a dart will fire
at me./I When Indiana Jones is about to step on the flagstone
in the corridor, he believes for a moment that a dart will fire
at him. But, he has also had countless encounters with
triangular blue flagstones in the past, not to mention similar
flagstones of different shape and color. From repeated expe
riences of stepping on flagstones with no ill effect, Indiana
Jones has formed the general rule that "In general, if I step of
a flagstone, nothing bad is going to happen to me."
Why does Indiana Jones end up acting on the general rule
and not the first causal inference? Hume addresses this
conflict between a general rule and another causal principle
in Section XIII:
/I

But as this frequent conjunction Ie.g. of triangular
blue flagstones and darts] necessarily makes it have
some effect upon the imagination, in spite of the
opposite conclusion from general rules, the opposi
tion of these two principles produces a contrariety in
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our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe the one infer
ence to our judgment, and the other to our imagina
tion. The general rule is attributed to ourjudgment; as
being more extensive and constant. The exception to
the imaginationi as being more capricious and uncer
tain. (Hume 149)
According to Bume, we endorse the general rule on account
of its "extensive and constant nature," as opposed to the
" capricious and uncertain" qualities of the other causal infer
ence. Therefore, we judge according to the general rule and
dismiss the other inference as misleading. It is difficult to
develop a consistent reading of these claims - as we saw in
the Cretan example, from an external! objective standard, the
consistency of our experiences does nothing to change the
unreasonableness of our inferences. What can Hume mean,
then? If Hume is talking about extensiveness, constancy,
capriciousness and uncertainty, he must not be referring to
how general rules categorize our past experience.
Before we give up on the external/ objective stance on
causality, it is worth considering w hat Bume says to suggest
it. When referring to the ways in which general rules modify
other beliefs, he claims if we take a review of this act of
mind" when we make inferences, we can"correct this pro
pensity (towards particular rules] by a reflection on the
nature of those circumstances," and "learn to distinguish the
accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes" (Hume
150, 148, 149). Taking a review, correcting, learning, and
reflection all imply an active frame of mind, a process of self
conscious reasoning. It almost suggests that we have reasons
for the conclusions we make after reflecting back on past
experience through general rules.
Despite this evidence, the external! objective stance seems
untenable. A major aspect of Bume's methodology has been
to show that what we, as first person observers, take to be
reasons, a "scientist of human nature" could account for as
simply the work of custom. If we accept his theory of causal
inferences, it becomes clear that we can never justify any
particular causal inference on an external/ objective ground
II
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- His unreasonable to believe it, butitis our nature to believe
it anyway. We might as well replace our usage of "causal
belief" with custom."
But perhaps we can take a different stance from the
external/ objective, and regard ourselves from the internal/
subjective perspective of minds that already have customs.
Given a set of customs which we hold, some recent and others
long-standing, when is a new custom good or bad? From this
perspective, we can make better sense of Hume's emphasis
on consistency and constancy in making normative judg
ments. Let us say that we have a set of customs A,B,C... ,Y,
and suddenly we develop custom Z. Should we endorse it?
According to this interpretation of Hume' s passage on p.149,
Z would be a good custom if it does not conflict with customs
A through Y. What happens if custom Y conflicts with
custom Z? We already know, on the basis of having a set of
customs, that custom Y is consistent with customs A through
Z. Therefore, based on its consistency and constancy, we
should accept custom Y. Custom Z is capricious and uncer
tain with respect to our other customs; therefore, we attribute
it to the mechanical workings of our imagination.
Hume appears to say something to this effect in his
description of the conflict between general rules. General
rules can allow us to "compare [a new belief/custom] with
the more general and authentic operations of the under
standing, [and] find it to be of an irregular nature, and
destructive of the most established principles of reasoningsi
which is the cause of our rejecting it" (Hume 150). By the
"most established principles of reasonings" we could inter
pret Hume to mean our most established customs, since as he
has argued before, all causal reasonings are the work of
custom.
On one level, this might be considered circular reasoning.
Why should we have any faith in customs A through Z to
begin with? This kind of objection forces us to change stances
- in order to hold the intemalist/subjective stance, we have
to assume that lithe curtain rises" with our mind holding
certain customs. This does not necessarily imply that we are
born with innate customs, only that we must refer our norma
II
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tive judgments about new customs to our old ones. Another
objection might be that judging on the basis of prior customs
is not normative. Saying that we ought to do something
suggests that there is a good reason for doing it: how can a
custom provide a reason? This objection can be best an~
swered by example. Let us say that after having spent a
semester studying in England, I developed the custom of
driving on the left side of the road. As soon as I return to
America, my newly~formed custom draws me towards driv
ing on the left. Should I endorse this custom? The answer is
no, since it conflicts with my much deeper-held custom of
driving on the right in America. This is a normative judg
ment about what I should do, even though it rests on achiev~
ing a consistency of customs.
What happens, one might ask, when a new belief sup~
plants an old one? Why ought we to endorse a new custom
over an old established custom? According to the internal!
subjective interpretation, we can only replace an old custom
if the new one provides greater consistency among the other
customs. When the physicist Paul Dirac discovered that one
of his equations presupposed the existence of the positron, a
sub-atomic particle which had not been experimentally con
firmed, he chose to believe his equation over the experimen
tal evidence. Why? For the reason that his custom of trusting
mathematical equations was deeper entrenched than his
custom of trusting experiments - the positron, if it existed,
would provide a much greater consistency among all his
other mathematical beliefs than any other accepted theory.
The implication of this view is that even the most unset
tling experience cannot upset all your beliefs, since you need
some deeply held belief to endorse this new experience. One
could argue that even Descartes the rationalist was aware of
this, when he refused to commence his descent into skepti
cism without a few provisional principles. Our reading of
Hume's paradoxical idea - that a general belief can only be
subverted through recourse to another general principle _
can help to explain a particularly cryptic passage from Chap_
ter XIII:
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Mean while the sceptics may here have the pleasure
of observing a new and signal contradiction in our
reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be
subverted by a principle of human nature, and again
sav'd by a new direction of the very same principle.
The following of general rules is a very
unphilosophical species of probability; and yet 'tis
only by following them that we can correct this, and
all other unphilosophical probabilities. (Hume 150)
We can understand this passage in the following way. From
what we can gather from Hume's examples, it seems that
most of the causal inferences we make in day-to-day experi
ence are general rules, not "pure" causal inferences. For
instance, Indiana Jones' inference that triangular blue flag
stones in the Temple of Doom were deadly was also a general
rule, since we can be fairly sure that those flagstones were not
completely identical. Likewise, his inference that most flag
stones are safe was a general rule, as was shown earlier.
Indiana Jones arrives at his judgment through an equilibrium
process, weighing all his beliefs/ customs in order to attain
maximum consistency. Any new general rule will have some
inconsistencies with his other beliefs/customs - in this
regard, it is an unphilosophical probability, in that by its
general nature it is bound to contradict some very refined
customs. But it is also philosophical, in that it provides us
with opportunity (as Dirac's equation did) to achieve an even
greater level of consistency. The push-and-pull of conflicting
general rules leads us from our gross customs towards in
creasingly refined ones.
Thus, by adopting an internal/ subjective standard to
wards general rules, we can better understand why Hume
believes general rules can lead to normative positions. But in
what way is it a consequence or boon to skepticism? The
above-cited passage shares a similar tone with the final
passages of Book I, in which Hume arrives at his "happy-face
skepticism." SW'prisingly, skepticism provides a solid foun
dation for normative judgments about causality - this con
clusion parallels in opposite direction the one on page 269,
where Hume realizes that "in yield[ing] to the current of
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nature, in submitting to my sense and understanding ... I
shewmost perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles."
This question, whether a skeptical project can create a sci
ence of human nature," rises beyond causality and frames the
interpretation of the entire Treatise.
If
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